Promarket Reforms and Allocation of Capital in India by Desai, Sameeksha et al.
  1 
PROMARKET REFORMS AND ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL IN INDIA  
 
Sameeksha Desai, desais@umkc.edu  
University of Missouri Kansas City 
Max Planck Institute of Economics 
 
Johan E. Eklund*, johan.eklund@ratio.se                                                                                                                    
Ratio Institute 
Jönköping International Business School 
  
Andreas Högberg, andreas.hogberg@ihh.hj.se                                                                                                                        





The government of India initiated pro-market reforms in the 1990s, after almost five 
decades of socialist planning. These and subsequent policy reforms are credited as the 
drivers  of  India’s  radical  economic  transformation.  Prior  to  reforms,  private 
investment was strictly regulated and restricted to certain areas and sectors. There 
have since been numerous changes in sectors important for investment, which should 
lead to changes in outcomes of firm-level strategic decision making and investment 
behavior. By most estimates, India will continue to grow. The purpose of this paper is 
to investigate changes in investment behavior from the introduction of reforms to 
current  conditions.  Reforms  changed  several  institutional  frameworks  for  firm 
operations,  allowing  firms  to  pursue  more  competitive  strategies.  Given  the 
importance  of  ownership  in  determining  firm  efficiency  and  access  to  capital,  we 
examine the effect of ownership on the performance of Indian firms for the period 
1991-2006. We also examine industry differences in capital allocation. We compute a 
measure of investment efficiency derived from the accelerator principle: Elasticity of 
capital with respect to output. We examine the effect of various ownership structures 
on investment behavior and the efficiently of capital allocation across different sectors 
of the economy. We find that the allocation of capital has been slow to respond to 
reforms, indicating similar pace of firm responses. 
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Immediately  after  its  independence  in  1947,  India  embraced  state-directed 
economic planning as its path to prosperity and self-sufficiency. In this economy, the 
state  would  lead  the  country  through  central  planning,  creating  jobs,  distributing 
resources and equitably providing public goods. Inspired by Fabian socialism, India 
created a intricate system of industry licensing and regulations known as the license 
Raj.  
However, these policies failed to inspire impressive economic development or 
growth. For the three decades following independence, average economic growth was 
1.25 percent annually, though several other “less promising” countries in Asia grew at 
much  faster  rates.  India’s  slow  growth  until  the  early  1990s  is  often  linked  to 
excessive or ineffective regulation (Besley and Burgess, 2004)
1. 
From the mid-1980s, gradual pro-market reforms were initiated, and gained 
momentum after a severe crisis of payments in the early 1990s and changing central 
government. By 1991, the push for such reforms led to tangible reductions of state 
control  and  interventionism  in  economic  activity.  As  a  result,  economic  growth 
increased to about 7.5 percent by 2007, and foreign direct investment increased from 
less than 0.1 percent of GDP in 1990 to about 2 percent of GDP (OECD, 2007).  
A  great  deal  of  research  has  examined  the  Indian  transition  from  a  highly 
planned  and  regulated  market  towards  a  more  open  economy.  There  have  been 
important changes in the size, strength and composition of economic activity. In fact, 
there is a robust body of literature on the Indian economy in general, both before and 
after  1991,  its  transition  after  independence  and  its  current  pattern  of  growth. 
However, it is difficult to separate smaller or individual institutional dynamics from 
parallel shifts in governance and institutional environment. 
In particular, the specific effects of broader institutional changes on firm level 
strategy and performance are still largely unknown. For example, deregulation of any 
kind can affect the firm’s strategic decisions because it creates new opportunities and 
potential  new  combinations  of  resources.  In  this  paper,  we  link  ownership  and 
allocation of capital to shed light on one such set of changes. In the next section, we 
briefly discuss deregulation and patterns of ownership in the context of pro-market 
reforms  in  India.  In  the  third  section,  we  present  our  methodology,  based  on  the 
accelerator principle, as well as our data. We discuss our results and conclude in the 
fourth section. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how efficiently Indian firms allocate 
recourses.  To  this  end,  we  use  the  accelerator  principle  from  which  we  derive  a 
measure of how swiftly firms respond to changes in demand and supply conditions: 
the  elasticity  of  capital  with  respect  to  output.  This  is  in  fact  a  measure  of  the 
functional efficiency of capital allocation. For capital allocation to be efficient the 
elasticity of capital with respect to output should be one
2. On average we find that the 
elasticity of capital is about 0.20, which suggests a weak capital market. Furthermore, 
we  find  no  general  improvement  in  capital  allocation  since  1991  when  gradual 
reforms  were  initiated.  However,  we  find  that  significant  industry  variation  and 
                                                 
1 The central government has historically been tasked with almost all regulatory functions, including 
regulations governing matters of trade, exports, capital, entry and labor. 
2 Eklund and Desai (2008) estimate the elasticity of capital for 44 countries and find the world average 
to be one.    3 
ownership matter for capital allocation. For example, institutional investors appear to 
improve  allocation  whereas  bank  ownership  reduces  the  elasticity  of  capital.  The 
major public policy implication is that previous policy reforms have been inadequate 
in terms of resource efficiency, and that further improvements in capital allocation 
need to come from further deregulation. 
 
 
REFORMS IN INDIA: A BRIEF DISCUSSION 
The Indian government made a strong effort to reform with its New Industrial 
Policy  in  1991.  This  policy  came  decades  after  the  original  Industrial  Policy 
Resolution  of  1948,  wherein  Jawaharlal  Nehru  emphasized  the  importance  of 
consistently  increasing  production.  In  1956,  a  new  Industrial  Policy  Resolution 
identified  rapid  economic  growth  as  the  path  to  a  socialist  society,  assigning  the 
primary  responsibility  of  economic  (and  industrial)  development  to  the  central 
government.  After  this,  multiple  Industrial  Policy  Statements  (in  1973  and  1977) 
demonstrated a shift in government perception and treatment of the private sector. In 
1980,  the  Industrial  Policy  Statement  laid  out  by  Prime  Minister  Indira  Gandhi 
specifically emphasized the need for competition and technological advancement in 
domestic industries, in order to encourage both exports and foreign investment inputs. 
Between  1980  and  1991,  multiple  government  initiatives  inched  slowly  toward 
institutional reforms, and finally, led to major changes with the New Industrial Policy 
in 1991. The New Industrial Policy of 1991 was designed to gradually reduce the 
extensive industrial licensing burden on firms, and to encourage stronger performance 
and increased competitiveness in public enterprises (see Sáez and Yang, 2001). 
There are two especially relevant areas for deregulation in India. On the one 
hand,  regulation  of  labor  is  relevant  because  of  the  size  and  resulting  productive 
capacity  of  the  workforce;  on  the  other  hand,  regulation  of  capital  and  financial 
institutions is relevant because of the structure of small business and the informal 
sector  in  India.  There  are  still  legislative  or  regulatory  impediments  to  firm 
performance. For example, there are disincentives from labor market regulations for 
firms that could exploit economies of scale. Manufacturing firms with more than 100 
employees  must  technically  receive  government  approval  to  fire  an  employee, 
potentially  making  firms  reluctant  to  grow  by  imposing  further  red  tape  on  their 
activities. The ability to hire and fire employees with ease is important for firms to be 
responsive to industry trends and market fluctuations
3. This is at least one contributing 
explanation for the dominance of small enterprises in the Indian economy: Firms with 
more than 10 employees account for only 3.75 percent of total employment
4. 
A common element in most economic reform strategies is deregulation of the 
financial  sector.  This  has  been  the  case  in  India.  For  example,  the  statutory 
requirements  for  certain  levels  of  investment  in  government  securities  have  been 
reduced. Large loans no longer require individual approval from the Reserve Bank of 
India, and the system for interest rate controls has been dismantled (Ahluwalia, 2002). 
Privatization and opening the economy to foreign investors began at the end of the 
                                                 
3 See Botero et al. (2004) for more on hiring and firing, and on labor regulation more generally. 
4 See OECD (2007) for this figured in developed countries. It is important to note that these numbers 
are for official, i.e. formally registered firms, but the unofficial sector in India is large. The imposition 
of certain regulations, including labor regulations, can create barriers to formal sector entry in many 
developing countries. See Klapper et al. (2006) for more on the regulation of entry. In the case of India, 
it is also likely that many firms with more than 10 employees are not captured in official estimates 
simply because they are not registered. However, this does not prevent them from operating.   4 
1990s, and the first public company was privatized and sold to foreign investors in 
1999.  Today,  100  percent  ownership  is  allowed  in  all  sectors  except  for  banking, 
insurance, telecommunication and airline industries. 
With respect to banking, reforms have led to improved performance but are 
still  necessary  in  terms  of  financial  services  infrastructure,  cost  of  intermediation, 
access to banking services, etc. (see Aziz et al., 2006). In addition, there are potential 
gains from further reform. Despite the risks of international financial integration, this 
can  still  lead  to  improved  “macroeconomic  policy  discipline”  and  financial  sector 
development (Aziz et al., 2006: xi). 
Public companies are less productive than private firms
5, which makes the 
case, at least in part, for revitalization
6. Privatization policies have focused on the sale 
of  minority  stakes  in  firms,  as  opposed  to  transferring  control.  In  spite  of  capital 
market reforms, state ownership remains pervasive in some key sectors and affects 
investment decisions. According to Ahluwalia (2002), the negative effects result from 
applying  civil  service  management  skills  to  private  sector  decisions:  “Even  if  the 
government  does  not  interfere  directly  in  credit  decisions,  government  ownership 
means managers of public sector banks are held to standards of accountability akin to 
civil servants, which tend to emphasize compliance with rules and procedures and 
therefore discourage innovative decision making (2002: 82)”.
7 This adds an implicit 
third  facet  of  public  policy  to  the  classic  problem  of  separating  ownership  and 
control
8.  
With respect to regulation of labor, Besley and Burgess (2004) study the effect 
of  labor  market  regulation  on  manufacturing  performance  in  India  for  the  period 
1958-1992. They find important differences across states based on state government 
enactment  of  pro-worker  or  pro-employer  policy.  They  find  pro-worker  labor 
regulation led to decreases in output, employment, investment and productivity in the 
(formal)  manufacturing  sector,  as  well  as  increases  in  informal  sector  output
9.  In 
general, studies of the regulation of labor find negative impacts for the economy, 
including higher unemployment and a greater share of the unofficial economy (see 
Botero et al, 2003). 
The regulation of labor typically affects employers or workers, whereas a wide 
range of other institutional determinants directly affects capital and other resource 
allocation.  These  institutions  include  ownership  structures,  financial  mechanisms 
governing  firm  interactions,  bankruptcy  law,  minority  shareholder  protection, 
property rights, broad legal and political mechanisms, etc. 
Sáez  and  Yang  (2001)  examine  three  sectors  for  effects  of  deregulation: 
Banking, energy and telecommunications. They conclude that although there has been 
improvement in these sectors, the change has been observed primarily in the relatively 
smaller  firms.  In  addition,  this  occurred  at  a  sub-national  level  rather  than  at  the 
national level. Despite improvements, the telecommunications and energy sectors are 
                                                 
5  A  number  of  studies  have  examined  firms  in  the  energy  sector.  See  Shukla  et  al.  (2005)  for  a 
discussion of relevant literature, and a study of how changes in ownership have affected provision of 
electricity. 
6 See OECD (2007). 
7  A  similar  point  is:  Short  of  privatization,  publicly  owned  companies  can  be  controlled  by  a 
government investment agency, rather than the ministries subsidizing the companies (as is the case 
now). See OECD (2007) for more. 
8 This also introduces perspectives from public choice, where the policy planner may also be the bank 
manager. For more on separation of ownership from policy-making, see OECD (2007). 
9 They also find pro-worker regulation is associated with higher urban poverty (2004: 93).   5 
still subject to heavy regulations. Therefore, firms working within – or affected by – 
these sectors still face significant inefficiencies related to firm organizing activities. 
Kumhakar  and  Sarkar  (2003)  examine  deregulation,  ownership  and 
productivity of firms in the Indian banking industry for the years 1985 to 1996. They 
estimate the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) for this sector. TFP is divided 
into three sub-components: Technical change, scale and miscellaneous. Using data for 
both public and private sector banks, and for periods before and after deregulation, 
they do not find an increase in the growth of TFP, as they had expected. This may be 
interpreted  as  a  lack  of  change  on  the  part  of  short  and  medium  term  bank-level 
policies in spite of deregulation. However, the authors find that private sector banks 
improved  their  performance,  likely  due  to  increased  freedom  to  expand  their 
operations and output. On the other hand, they also find that public sector banks have 
not had a strong response to deregulation. 
The actual effects of deregulation on resource allocation among Indian firms 




Our method in this paper is based on the accelerator principle. The accelerator 
principle holds that investments are determined by changes in output. If output grows, 
this  is  taken  to  reflect  a  growing  need  for  capital.  The  simple  accelerator  model 
assumes that output is proportional to capital. By the same token, any level of output 
will  also  be  associated  with  the  stock  of  capital.  This  method  is  in  fact  a  way 
measuring what Tobin (1984) labeled the functional efficiency of capital markets. The 
accelerator model is also intimately associated with Samuelsson’s (1939) accelerator-
multiplicator  model  of  business  cycles.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the 
accelerator methodology derived here see Eklund and Desai (2008). The accelerator 
model with a desired level of capital denoted
*
t K is determined by the output  t Y : 
 
   t t kY K =
*                       (1) 
 
In the equation, k, is the capital coefficient. Assuming that the desired level of capital 
is equal to the actual capital denoted t K , changes in the desired stock of capital are 
proportional to net investments,  t I and( ) 1 − − t t K K . Net investments  t I  can be denoted 
as: 
 
   ( ) 1 1 − − − = − = t t t t t Y Y K K I λ                (2) 
 
Given the formulation of net investments in equation (2), these are proportional to the 
change in output over time and an acceleratorλ . Given the assumption of desired 
capital is equal to actual capital still holds, then it is given that k = λ . However, this 
assumption is not normally fulfilled.  
By dividing both sides of the equation with  1 − t K  the following equation is 
obtained:  
 















− = t t kY K  we can substitute 
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λ                  (4) 
 
Now 
* λ   represents k / λ ,  or  the  elasticity  of  capital  with  respect  to  output  (here 
reflected  by  sales).  Thanks  to  the  normalization,  it  is  possible  to  make  empirical 
estimations of equation 4.  
Assuming that  t t K K =
*  over time will give  k = λ   resulting in  1
* = λ . If the 
adjustment is incomplete and partial, so  t t K K ≠
* the elasticity of capital with respect 
to output, λ
*, will be < 1.   
An  alternative  to  net  investments  is  to  use  gross  investments.  Gross 
investments  are  obtained  by  adding  replacement  investment  (depreciation  of  old 
assets).  Assuming  that  these  are  proportional  to  the  old  capital  stock  this  can  be 
denoted as δKt-1. Gross investments (GI) are thus defined as equation (2) plus δKt-1, 
t t t Y K GI ∆ + = − λ δ 1 .  Mutatis  mutandis,  corresponding  equation  for  GI  is 
1
*
1 − − ∆ + = t t t t Y Y K GI λ δ .  In  empirical  applications  this  means  that  the  only 
difference between net and gross investments will be captured by the intercept.  
We estimate the following equation: 
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In equation 5, the elasticity of capital with respect to sales is represented by 
* λ , I is 
representing investments made by the firm i in time period t. Capital stock in period t-
1  is  denoted  K  and  S  denotes  sales  in  period  t.  To  control  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity, we include a fixed effect ηj where j represents industry or firm effects. 
To control for business cycle fixed year effects, θt, are included. 
Using  panel  data  with  fixed  effects,  we  can  also  add  interaction  variables 
(dummies). These dummies may represent different characteristics not captured in the 
general equation. In our case, dummies represent different types of owners of firms. 
We  also  use  time  dummies  for  time-specific  effects.  Using  interaction  terms,  the 
empirical equation will have following functional from:  
 





















































+ + + = −
− − − −
  (6) 
 
where  the  X’s  denote  explanatory  variables.  Thus,  the  elasticity  of  capital,  λ
*, 
corresponds to the marginal effect in Equation (6):  
 
   1 1 2 1
* ... − × + + × + = n n X X β β β λ              (7) 
 
Using interaction explanatory variables with sales growth makes it possible to 






We collect firm-level accounting data on investments, capital stock and sales 
from the Prowess India database
11.  Total assets is used as a measure of the capital 
stock, Kt, and we choose sales as our measure of output. We use net investments 
(∆Kt), measured as change in total assets.
13   
 
Exact variable definitions and the sources are reported in Table 1. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
We exclude the financial sector since investments made by financial firms are of a 
very  different  nature  compared  to  other  sectors.  All  accounting  figures  have  been 
adjusted for inflation with CPI from IMF. 
The ownership data available from the Prowess database can be subdivided in 
to a number of broad categories. There are two main ownership categories: Promoters 
and non-promoters. “Promoters” is defined by Indian legislation
14 and is basically 
synonymous to controlling owner. A promoter is legally defined as a person who is in 
“control”  of  the  company  and  has  the  right  to  appoint  directors  or  control 
management. See Appendix A for more on this definition. “Non-promoters” refers to 
a  dispersed  ownership  stake,  thus  held  by  non-controlling  owners.  Apart  from 
distinguishing between Indian promoters and foreign promoters, it is not possible to 
further subdivide the promoter category
15. Thus, the following are included within the 
promoter category and cannot be extricated: Individual/family promoters, state and 
government  promoters,  corporate  promoters  and  institutional  promoters.  This  is 
unfortunate,  considering  that  the  classic  managerial  economics  literature  would 
hypothesize different objectives for actors in these categories, and this is likely to 
influence  capital  allocation  accordingly.  It  is  possible  however  to  subdivide  non-
promoters into a number of subcategories. This is meaningful considering that non-
promoters represent the mirror image of promoters (promoters being an measure of 
ownership concentration).  
Very  few  firms  in  India  are  characterized  by  a  structure  of  dispersed 
ownership.  In 2006, only  126 of 2050  firms had a dispersed ownership structure, 
where no owner controlled 20 percent or more of the shares. See Table 2 for data on 
holdings of promoters and non-promoters. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
                                                 
11 This database is provided by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd. (CMIE). The 
usual accounting caveats apply. 
13 As a robustness test we have also used mesure gross investments. By large the estimates are robust so 
we do not report any results for gross investments. We measure gross investment: It = Profit after tax – 
dividends + depreciation + ∆Equity + ∆Debt + R&D + Advertising & Marketing expenses. 
14  The  term  promoter  is  defined  in  Regulation  2(h)  SEBI  (Substantial  Acquisitions  of  Shares  and 
Takeovers) Regulation 1997.  
15 Promoters also include a subcategory for persons acting in concert. However, this ownership 
category is not examined further in this paper.     8 
95 percent of firms had an Indian promoter (controlling owner) and 86 percent had an 
Indian promoter owning more than 20 percent. Some 10 percent of firms had some 
degree  of  state  or  government  ownership,  and  about  4  percent  had  a  state  or 
government promoter.  On average,  Indian promoters own about 46 percent of the 
shares,  whereas  the  average  ownership  of  foreign  promoters  is  about  28  percent. 
However, the overall average promoter holding is just above 50 percent. The reason 
that total promoter holding is larger than Indian and foreign promoters separately is 
that in a number of cases, foreign and domestic promoters act in concert and thus 
jointly are defined as promoters. Since it not possible to distinguish between various 
promoter categories, this ownership data is fairly problematic to analyze. 
In contrast to data on promoters, data on various categories of non-promoters 
is  available.  Non-promoters  are  divided  into  institutional  non-promoters  and  non-
institutional promoters. The institutional non-promoter group is further split into: (1) 
mutual  funds  (2)  banks,  financial  institutes  and  insurance  companies  (3)  foreign 
institutional investors. It is not possible to identify the extent to which bank, financial 
institutions and insurance companies are state or governmental controlled. 
To begin with, we construct a unbalanced panel consisting of more than 3900 
companies, for the period 1991 to 2006. Since we use growth in sales and the capital 
stock from previous periods, we have data for five years (1991-2006). In total, 48623 
observations remain once missing observation are excluded. Unfortunately the data 
does not follow a normal distribution; the skewness and kurtosis test for normality  
clearly  indicates  non-normality.  This  is  mainly  due  to  extreme  outliers.  A  more 
normal  distribution  is  achieved  by  trimming  the  data  and  excluding  5
th  and  95
th 
percentiles of our dependent and independent variables. . After this, 6457 companies 
and 45443 observations remain. Unfortunately ownership data are only available from 
2001 until 2006, which corresponds to 12423 observations.  
We  use  industry  effects  in  all  regressions  to  control  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity  across  firms.  Industry  effects  are  theoretically  appropriate  because 
much unobserved heterogeneity across firms can be attributed to industry differences, 
due  to  regulatory  differences  across  industries.  However,  the  empirical  results  are 
unaffected by the choice between fixed industry and fixed firm effects.   
In addition to the sales accelerator, the overall elasticity of capital has also 
been estimated using a profit accelerator and a value added accelerator. The value 
added  accelerator  was  insignificant.  The  profit  accelerator  was  significant,  but 
economically  negligible.  A  possible  explanation  is  the  poor  quality  of  accounting 
data, rendering profits and value added incomparable across firms. Using fixed effect 
estimation, the overall R
2 for the profit accelerator was less than one percent. One 
possible  interpretation  is  that  sales  is  a  fairly  reliable  figure  and  reported  in  a 
relatively consistent manner across firm, whereas one can expect significant variation 
in the way profits and value added are reported
16.  The measure of investment we use 
solves  some  of  these  problems  by  adding  back  depreciation  and  all  items  in  the 
income statement and balance sheet that can be counted as investment.   
 
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
We estimate the overall elasticity to be approximately 0.20, which is relatively low. 
The elasticity for India suggests that it takes at least five years for the average firm to 
                                                 
16 Companies  may  for example have incentives to understate profits and labor costs necessary  for 
calculating value added may be reported differently across companies.    9 
adjust  to  changes  in  demand  and  supply  conditions.  From  investment  theory,  one 
would expect the elasticity of capital to be equal to one. An elasticity  below one 
indicates that firms are only partially adjusting the capital stock to changes in output. 
An elasticity below one (λ
* < 1) implies that investments are not expanded up to the 
point where marginal return on capital equates with the opportunity cost of capital.   
  This method has previously been applied by Eklund and Desai (2008), who 
estimate the elasticity of capital across 44 countries. They estimate the world average 
elasticity of capital to be 0.91, which is not significantly different from one. However, 
they find significant variation across countries. For example, estimates for the US and 
China  are  1.16  and  0.48  respectively.  The  estimate  for  India  is  0.69,  but  for  a 
significantly smaller sample than used in this paper (169 firms).    
Results for ownership categories are reported in Table 3. Table 3  contains 
regular fixed effects results.  
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------- 
The regressions include industry and time fixed effects. In addition, industry dummies 
have been interacted with ∆St/St-1 and the coefficients constrained to sum to zero, 
such that industry specific elasticities are obtained. This means that any significant 
effect of ownership on the elasticity of capital cuts across industries. As a robustness 
check we have also estimated equation 7 with gross investments (as defined in note 
8).  The  results  are  by  and  large  robust  and  thus  not  reported  here.  Additional 
robustness  checks  include  multilevel  mix  effects  models  where  we  allow  industry 
elasticities to vary randomly over time. We find no general trend towards improved 
capital allocation over time, nor do we find any improvement in industry allocation. 
Industry  specific  elasticities  are  reported  in  table  4.  Most  of  the  industries  report 
elasticities ranging from 15 to 25 percent (see table 4), which is very low compared to 
what would be expected for developed countries. One possible explanation for this 
low figure can be that we only look at large incumbent firms, whereas most of the 
growth dynamics can be expected in small young firms. Another explanation for small 
industry differences may be that regulatory reforms differ significantly across regions. 
For example, Aghion et al. (2006) find that dismantling the License Raj has proceeded 
at different speeds across regions In India. One of their findings is that industries in 
regions  with  relatively  pro-employer  policies  have  grown  faster  than  industries  in 
regions with relative pro-worker policies.   
   
The fact that it is not possible to break down the foreign and Indian promoters 
into  further  subcategories  is  a  limitation.  It  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  different 
promoters have different objectives. These objectives may be closely related to the 
classic problems of agency that occur when ownership and control are separated – this 
is an interesting subject for further study. This may account for the fact that promoters 
have no robust significant effect on the allocation of capital. 
Looking at non-promoters, institutional investors appear to improve allocation 
of  capital.  Breaking  down  institutional  investors  into  its  subcategories  reveals  an 
interesting pattern. Mutual funds and foreign institutional investors appear to improve 
capital allocation whereas banks seem to have a negative impact. This negative impact 
of banks is, however, not robust. Institutional investors seem to increase the elasticity 
of capital by about 2 percentage points. The positive effect of foreign institutional 
investors  is  consistent  with  theories  of  international  development  and  foreign   10 
investment, which tend to support the role of foreign investors (in general) in creating 
greater openness and accountability in recipient countries. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------- 
This  paper  investigates  investment  behavior  and  how  efficiently  capital  is 
allocated  to  its  most  productive  end.  We  use  the  accelerator  principle  to  derive  a 
measure of capital allocation: Elasticity of capital with respect to output. This measure 
reveals how effectively firms and industries respond to changes in the desired capital 
stock. At one level, this measure also reflects the outcomes of strategic changes in 
firm-level policies and investment decisions possibly driven by reforms.  
We find that controlling owners (or promoters as they are referred to in India) 
have no significant impact on the allocation of capital. The reason for this result may 
be that we are unable to distinguish between various types of controlling owners, i.e. 
government promoters and private individual or families. With respect to dispersed 
ownership (or non-promoter holdings as they are referred to in India), we observe 
significant  effects  of  ownership.  Institutional  investors  significantly  improve  the 
allocation  of  capital.  We  observe  an  interesting  pattern  in  subcategories  of 
institutional  owners:  Mutual  funds  and  foreign  institutional  investors  improve  the 
allocation  of  capital  whereas  banks  have  none  or  negative  effect.  We  also  find 
significant variation in capital allocation across industries. The ownership effects cut 
across industries.  
The overall finding is that despite economic reforms, the efficiency of capital 
allocation remains fairly slow. This indicates that there is a significant lag between the 
introduction  of  economic  reforms,  and  firm-level  responses.  It  is  possible  that 
strategic decision-making at the firm level does not respond immediately, or that is 
may be more strongly influenced by internal firm factors, such as human resources. 
The slowness of changes in capital allocation is consistent with the idea of “sticky” 
institutions in the economic development research. This is still somewhat surprising 
because  of  the  improvements  in  stock  and  equity  markets,  as  well  as  strong  and 
consistent development of commercial banks (Aziz et al., 2006). However, we find 
that the overall elasticity  of  capital is about 26 percent, implying that  when sales 
increase 10 percent, the capital stock on average increases by only 2.6 percent. 
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Table 1     Variables and definitions 
Component  Definition 
   
Sales  The sum of industrial sales and income from non-
financial services.  Source: Prowess 




Inflation is measured with the average consumer price 
index. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook 
Database 2007.  
Ownership categories   
Promoters holding (%)  The dominant/controlling owner. Indian law defines 
promoters as the person in “control” of the company.  
All ownership categories are measured as percentage 
share of the equity capital.  
Indian Promoters(%)  Domestic controlling owners, Source: Prowess  
Foreign Promoters(%)  Foreign controlling owner, Source: Prowess 
Persons acting in concert (%) - Promoters 
Persons/owners acting in concert as controlling owners, 
Source: Prowess 
Non-promoters holding (%) 
 
Non-promoters are the shares held by non controlling 
owners, i.e. dispersed ownership, Source: Prowess 
 Institutions (%) - Non-Promoters 
 
Institutional non-promoters are the sum of the shares 
held by mutual funds, banks and foreign institutional 
investors. Source: Prowess 
Mutual Funds / UTI (%) - Non-Promoters 
 
This category includes non-promoting mutual funds 
Source: Prowess 
Banks, FI's, Insurance Cos. (%) - Non-Promoters 
 
This category include non-promoting banks, financial 
institutes and insurance companies. 
Source: Prowess 
Foreign Institutional investors (%)- Non-Promoters 
 
 
This category includes non-promoting foreign 
institutional investors 
Source: Prowess 
Non-institutions (%) - Non-Promoters 
 
This category include non-promoter non-institutional 
investors 
Source: Prowess 








Individuals (%) - Non-Promoters 
 
This category include non-promoting individual 
investors Source: Prowess 
Other Non-institutions (%) - Non-Promoters 
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Obs New!!! 
Table 2 Mean share of ownership per type of owner and per year 
   Average ownership per year 
Type of owner  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Promoters holding (%)  50.62  51.80  51.23  50.32  50.40 
    Indian Promoters(%)  39.37  40.29  39.28  38.71  43.87 
    Foreign Promoters(%)  5.93  6.08  5.86  5.95  6.53 
    Persons acting in concert (%) – Promoters  5.32  5.44  6.09  5.66  0 
Non-promoters holding (%)  49.38  48.16  48.77  49.59  49.23 
    Institutions (%) - Non-Promoters  6.85  6.44  6.22  6.85  7.14 
        Mutual Funds / UTI (%) - Non-Promoters  1.81  1.54  1.45  1.63  1.74 
        Banks, FI's, Insurance Cos. (%) - Non-Promoters  4.34  3.77  3.37  2.94  2.80 
        Foreign Institutional investors (%)- Non-Promoters  0.70  1.14  1.38  2.27  2.65 
    Non-institutions (%) - Non-Promoters  42.53  41.71  42.57  42.79  41.82 
        Corporate Bodies (%) - Non-Promoters  9.99  10.15  10.92  11.22  9.03 
        Individuals (%) - Non-Promoters  31.42  30.31  30.28  30.11  30.41 
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OBS NEW!!!!! 
 Appendix 1  Summary statistics, ownership 2002 - 2006 
Type of owner  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Promoters holding (%)  12423  50.66  19.53  0  100 
    Indian Promoters(%)  12423  39.94  23.15  0  100 
    Foreign Promoters(%)  12423  6.11  16.81  0  97.45 
    Persons acting in concert (%) - Promoters  12423  4.61  11.61  0  98.44 
Non-promoters holding (%)  12423  49.26  19.51  0  100 
    Institutions (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  6.87  10.21  0  82.43 
        Mutual Funds / UTI (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  1.71  3.52  0  35.41 
        Banks, FI's, Insurance Cos. (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  3.63  6.65  0  30.63 
        Foreign Institutional Investors (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  1.50  4.63  0  56.59 
        Other Institutions (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  0.02  0.63  0  47.53 
    Non-institutions (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  42.39  20.24  0  100 
        Corporate Bodies (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  10.28  11.21  0  99.29 
        Individuals (%) - Non-Promoters  12423  30.66  17.11  0  99.81 











 Appendix 2, Correlations         OBS NEW!  
*  Correlation is significant at the 5 percent level  
    Promoters holding  Non-promoters holding 
  SALE 
Total 

























1                           
Total assets 
0.71*  1                         
Growth in Sales, ∆St/St-1 
0.01*  0.00  1                       
Investment ratio, It/Kt-1 
0.02*  0.01*  0.40*  1                     
Promoters holding  
0.05*  0.05*  0.01  0.07*  1                   
Indian Promoters 
0.05*  0.06*  0.01  0.07*  0.60*  1                 
Foreign Promoters 
-0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.02*  0.28*  -0.43*  1               
Non-promoters holding  
-0.05*  -0.05*  -0.01  -0.07*  -1*  -0.60*  -0.28*  1             
Institutions - Non-Promoter 
0.15*  0.18*  0.03*  0.05*  -0.19*  -0.16*  0.03*  0.19*  1           
Mutual Funds / UTI  Non-
Promoters  0.07*  0.08*  0.03*  0.07*  -0.11*  -0.11*  0.07*  0.11*  0.63*  1         
Banks, FI's, Insurance Cos. 
Non-Promoters  0.07*  0.08  -0.06*  -0.11*  -0.16*  -0.13*  -0.00  0.16*  0.73*  0.24*  1       
Foreign Institutional Investors   
Non-Promoters  0.17*  0.21  0.11*  0.21*  -0.11*  -0.08*  0.02*  0.10*  0.61*  0.29*  0.07*  1     
Non-institutions  Non-
Promoters  -0.12*  -0.14*  -0.03  -0.10*  -0.86*  -0.50*  -0.29*  0.87*  -0.32*  -0.22*  -0.23*  -0.20*  1   
Corporate Bodies - Non-
Promoters  -0.05*  -0.06*  0.02*  0.01  -0.48*  -0.28*  -0.15*  0.48*  -0.11*  -0.08*  -0.08*  -0.06*  0.52*  1 
Individuals Non-Promoters 
-0.12*  -0.15*  -0.03  -0.15*  -0,65*  -0.37*  -0.23*  0.65*  -0.34*  -0.22*  -0.23*  -0.24*  0.79*  -0.03*   15 
Table 3  Ownership and Allocation of Capital   OBS NEW! 
The regressions include industry effects, time effects, time dummies and industry dummies interacted with growth in sales, and constrained to zero. *indicates significance at 
1 percent level.
Robust regression with industry dummies, year dummies, and time and industry specific elasticity’s  Dependent variable: It/Kt-1 






















Promoters  0.001* 
(5.25) 
                   
  Indian promoters    0.001* 
(4.71) 
                 
  Foreign promoters      0.000 
(0.67) 
               
Non-promoters        -0.001* 
(-5.25) 
             
  Institutions          0.003* 
(6.74) 
           
      Mutual funds            0.015* 
(10.50) 
         
      Banks, FI. and 
insurance com. 
            -0.004* 
(-5.63) 
       
    Foreign Institutional                0.011* 
(12.87) 
     
  Non-institutions                  -0.002* 
(-8.19) 
   
    Individuals                    -0.002* 
(-9.25) 
 
    Corporate                       -0.001* 
(-2.08) 























2                       
F-value  34.03  33.97  33.68  34.04  34.27  35.12  34.09  35.85  34.56  34.80  33.73 
No. observations   12423  12423  12423  12423  12423  12423  12423  12423  12423  12423  12423 
Marginal effects evaluated 
at mean 
0.175  0.185  0.182  0.194  0.184  0.184  0.182  0.180  0.177  0.164  0.181 Table 4,  Industry specific elasticity’s 
* indicates significance at 5 percent. The industry elasticity’s have been estimated with industry and 
year fixed effect. To obtain the industry specific elasticity’s ∆St/St-1 has been interacted with industry 
dummies and constrained to sum to zero.  
Industry   Industry 
code
17 
Elasticity  t-value  No. 
observations 
Overall elasticity of capital (all industry weighted average)      0.225*     4.55  45443   
1 Agriculture, hunting and related service activities   1    0.156    -1.28  469   
2 Forestry, logging and related services  2    1.985  0.84  2   
3 Mining of coal, lignite and extraction of peat   10    0.304  0.70  140   
4 Extraction of crude petroleum, natural gas and incidental activities  11    0.196  -0.48  131   
5 Mining of uranium and thorium  12    0.489  0.49  11   
6 Mining of metal ores  13    0.199  -0.40  154   
7 Other mining and quarrying  14    0.087*  -2.52  463   
8 Manufacturing of food and beverages  15    0.135*  -1.80  4060   
9 Manufacture of tobacco products  16    0.364  1.52  114   
10 Manufacturing of textiles   17    0.172  -1.06  3574   
11 Manufacture of wearing, dressing and dyeing of fur  18    0.217  -0.15  423   
12 Tanning and dressing of leather, saddler et cetera  19    0.165  -1.03  305   
13 Manufacture of wood, cork, straw and plating material   20    0.151  -1.03  165   
14 Manufacture of paper and paper products  21    0.143  -1.55  1057   
15 Publish and printing   22    0.302  1.20  293   
16 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel  23    0.219  -0.11  385   
17 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  24    0.185  -0.81  7549   
18 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  25    0.181  -0.87  2266   
19 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  26    0.096*  -2.50  1631   
20 Manufactire of basic metals   27    0.206  -0.38  3027   
21Manufacture of fabricated metal, except machinery and equipment  28    0.207  -0.35  897   
22 Manufacture of machinery and equipment N.E.C.*  29    0.195  -0.59  2568   
23 Manufacturing of office, accounting and computing machinery  30    0.262  0.65  254   
24 Manufacturing of electrical machninery and apparatus N.E.C.*  31    0.218  -0.13  1387   
25 Manufacturing of radio, television and communication apparatus  32    0.178  -0.89  901   
26 Manufacturing of medical, precision and optical instruments, clocks 
and watches 
33    0.234  0.17  379   
27 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34    0.286  1.19  2052   
28 Manufacture of other transport equipment  35    0.156  -1.20  330   
29 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing N.E.C.*  36    0.203  -0.40  491   
30 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  40    0.121*  -1.88  443   
31 Construction  45    0.186  -0.76  1304   
32 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles  50    -0.407  -1.14  6   
33 Wholesale trade and commission trade except motor vehicles  51    0.166  -1.17  3176   
34 Retail trade and repair of personal and household goods  52    0.281  0.78  57   
35 Hotels and restaurants  55    0.092*  -2.47  793   
36 Land transport; transport via pipelines  60    0.333*  1.70  263   
37 Water transport  61    0.205  -0.32  233   
38 Air transport  62    0.312  1.02  75   
39 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities  63    0.162  -1.01  189   
40 Post and telecommunication  64    0.209  -0.29  246   
41 Real estate activities  70    0.194  -0.49  150   
42 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator   71    0.364*  1.82  48   
43 Computer and related activities  72    0.251  0.51  1460   
44 Research and developmet  73    0.053  -1.33  9   
45 Other business activities  74    0.143  -1.43  255   
                                                 
17 Industry codes follow India’s national industrial classification (NIC) 2004.  17 
 
46 Education  80    -0.141*  -2.62  19   
47 Health and social work  85    0.149  -1.22  229   
48 Activities of membership organizations N.E.C.*   91    0.163  -0.60  21   
49 Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  92    0.191  -0.63  334   
50Undifferentiated service-producing activities  97    0.122  -1.28  40   
51Diversified   98    0.219  -0.11  614   
* N.E.C: not elsewhere classified. 